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Abstract 
Brazil was the largest importer of slaves during the Atlantic slave trade. Yet, the lack of disaggregated 
data able to capture the intensity of slavery across time and space means that researchers have struggled 
to identify an economic legacy of the institution. I propose to measure slavery using the presence of 
communities descended from those founded by runaway slaves: the Quilombos. Combining this 
measure with municipal level data, I illustrate the adverse impact of slavery on a broad range of 
indicators of economic development, both while slavery still existed and more than 30 years after its 
abolition. Additionally, I exploit the creation of communities set up to host newly arrived migrants from 
Europe to show that European immigration taking place while slavery existed led to better 
developmental outcomes. This complements the previous finding by indicating that exiting a slave-
based economy earlier thanks to an influx of free workers was beneficial for economic development. 
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the effect of slavery on economic development in Brazil. While evidence of the
detrimental legacy of the institution is abundant for other parts of the world – including several
Latin American countries – researchers have struggled to identify one in Brazil, despite the
country being the largest importer of slaves during the Atlantic slave trade. Two main challenges
explain this. First, slaves did not distribute themselves randomly, but tended to be located in
areas experiencing commodity booms or, more generally, growing rapidly. Unsurprisingly, these
same areas tended to score relatively better on developmental indicators. The second, and
perhaps bigger, challenge is the scarcity of disaggregated data on the distribution of slaves
across Brazil. The only detailed information available to us comes from the 1872 census, the
sole one carried out while slavery existed. While the census is an excellent source of information,
it captures a snapshot of slavery in its latter phases and after the momentous changes brought
about by the commodity cycles of the preceeding four centuries. Thus, the census provides an
extremely partial picture of the incidence of slavery across time and space.
In order to tackle the issue of measurement, I propose a proxy for the intensity of slavery,
which aims at capturing its long-term intensity and is thus complementary to the census. This
is the presence of communities descended from runaway slaves – the Quilombos – in modern
day Brazil. The hypothesis is that these communities, officially recognized by the Brazilian
state since 1988, are more abundant in areas where large-scale slavery was more prevalent and
long-lived. Therefore, conditional on accounting for their probability of survival until today,
Quilombos should provide a measure of slavery in the past. I offer empirical evidence that this
is indeed the case.
Using this alternative data source is also helpful to deal with the first challenge. This
is because the spatial distribution of runaway slave communities is largely tied to economic
activities that had lost economic relevance by the second half of the 19th century and are
thus unlikely to have been affecting economic development directly by the time I observe the
outcomes. Nonetheless, to further deal with potential endogeneity, I also directly control for the
incidence of the commodity booms and employ a propensity score matching strategy to account
for further differences between Quilombo and non-Quilombo municipalities, which may bias the
results.
I study a variety of indicators to capture the heterogenous nature of development, including:
human capital, population density, wages, fiscal and state capacity. In terms of geography, I
focus on the epicenter of the changes in Brazil’s economy in the 19th and early 20th century: the
provinces/states of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo. Using the methods described
and this alternative measure of slavery, I show that municipalities with a higher intensity of
slavery had worse developmental outcomes both while slavery still existed and decades after
its abolition. The results are strongest and most robust for literacy, public employment and
public expenditure. Moreover, I also show that the post-Abolition outcomes are not fully
explained by differences, arising while slavery still existed. This suggests that the legacy of
slavery continued to damage local economic development long after Abolition, presumably by
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hindering the development of new forms of economic activity.
As a final step, I highlight a new channel through which slavery affected development. I
show that municipalities containing colonies founded to house European immigrants had better
developmental outcomes than municipalities devoid of them. Crucially, this is only the case
for immigrant colonies created while slavery existed, while no recognizable differences exist for
communities founded after the abolition of slavery in 1888. Using placebo tests, I demonstrate
that the relationship is causal. Additionally, I provide narrative evidence supporting the hy-
pothesis that differential developmental paths can be traced back to the contrast between free
and slave labour and the associated institutional developments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I discuss literature related to the paper in
Section 2 and provide an overview of key events in Brazilian history in Section 3. Section 4
outlines the empirical strategy employed in the paper, Section 5 illustrates the data, and Section
6 presents the results of the analysis. Section 7 digs deeper into the possible channels of the
effects found, while Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is linked to four main strands of literature, making it of interest to those concerned
with both Brazil’s economic history and economic development more generally. First, Brazil
represents an ideal testing ground to improve our understanding of the effect of slavery on eco-
nomic and institutional development. Economic historians and other social scientists have long
postulated a relationship between slavery and economic underdevelopment. Stanley Engerman
and Kenneth Sokolof, for example, famously argued that parts of the Americas employing large
scale slavery had an adverse institutional evolution and relatively worse economic development
compared to other parts of the continent (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2012). The hypothesis
has obtained only partial empirical confirmation (Nunn, 2008; Bruhn and Gallego, 2012),1 but
a growing body of work – for example Dell (2010), Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson
(2012), Markevich and Zhuravskaya (2018) and Buggle and Nafziger (2018) – has convincingly
demonstrated the existence of a negative relationship between various forms of coerced labour
and economic development in a number of countries.
The story is different for Brazil. As already mentioned, while the country was the largest
importer of slaves during the Atlantic slave trade, with nearly 5 million Africans forcefully
transported across the ocean between the 16th and 19th century (Klein and Luna, 2010), the
economic and institutional legacies of slavery in the country have not been firmly established.
Although a number of studies have attempted to investigate the link between slavery and long-
term development, their findings are largely inconclusive in this respect (Summerhill, 2010; de
Carvalho Filho and Colistete, 2010; Reis, 2017). Some studies offer indirect evidence of the
1Nunn finds a negative relationship between slavery and development, but not through the channel of large scale
plantation agriculture posited by Engerman and Sokoloff. Moreover, he finds no support for inequality being the
channel of persistence. Bruhn and Gallego find a link between colonial activities involving increasing returns to
scale and worse economic outcomes today through the channel of less representative political institutions, but
find no link between the exploitation of forced labour and development.
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impact of slavery and of extractive colonial activities more generally (Naritomi, Soares, and
Assunc¸a˜o, 2012; Musacchio, Mart´ınez Fritscher, and Viarengo, 2014; de Carvalho, 2015), but
the only paper showing evidence of a direct legacy of slavery in Brazil is Fujiwara et al’s work
on the link between slavery and contemporary inequality (Fujiwara, Laudares, and Valencia
Caceido, 2017). Therefore, this paper offers prima facie evidence on the negative impact of
slavery on economic development in Brazil.
Second, despite significant improvements in recent decades, Brazil today is still characterized
by widespread poverty and illiteracy, massive regional and interpersonal inequality and an
overall weak institutional environment. Brazil is, furthermore, plagued by corruption and tax
evasion, as well as inefficient and wasteful public spending, features strongly connected with
institutional weakness.2 These features have deep roots.
For example, Brazil’s woes with the poor fiscal resources commanded by all levels of gov-
ernment – national, provincial/state and municipal – and the connected deficient provision of
public goods were a topic of discussion amongst policymakers and commentators already in
the 19th century (Nunes Leal, 1977).3 There is also modern evidence that low public spending
acted as a constraint for growth due to the suboptimal provision of infrastructure and education
in the mid and late 1800s (Leff, 1997; Summerhill, 2005). The inadequate financing of local
governments has been an issue of particular importance, both in the 19th and 20th century. The
paltry resources commanded by municipalities played an important role in the low provision of
public goods, particularly primary education, in this latter period (Kang, 2017), for example.4
I show that slavery played a role in these outcomes.
Third, this paper also contributes to the growing literature on state capacity and develop-
ment along two dimensions. To begin with, little is still known about the formation of fiscal and
state capacity outside of Europe, particularly at the sub-national level (Hoffman, 2015; Nafziger,
2016; Johnson and Koyama, 2017). This is despite the fact that understanding the processes
through which polities acquire the capacity to tax and perform the basic tasks of modern states
is of fundamental importance in order to shed light on the ways in which public institutions
can support or stifle economic growth and development.5 By studying the relationship between
slavery and fiscal/state capacity at the municipal level in Brazil, this paper adds a piece to the
puzzle.
Additionally, a good portion of the debate on long-term development has focused on identi-
fying the ultimate cause of why some countries are rich and some are poor, with institutions and
2See Shleifer and Vishny (1993) on the ties between state weakness and corruption. See Reis (2017) for a historical
perspective on spatial income inequality in Brazil and Alston, Melo, Mueller, and Pereira (2016) for an overview
of the progress made by Brazil in some of these areas in the last two decades.
3See also Abreu and do Lago (2001) for a survey of Brazilian fiscal history since colonization and Summerhill
(2015) for an excellent account of public finances and borrowing at the national level in Imperial Brazil.
4Up to this day, the fiscal capacity of local governments matters for the provision of public services. Gadenne
(2017) finds that Brazilian municipalities that expand their revenue through taxation, as opposed to grants from
the federal government, over which they have the same level of discretion, are more likely to spend them on
productive public goods.
5Some recent contributions outlining this point are Acemoglu (2005); Besley and Persson (2014); Hoffman (2015);
Dincecco and Katz (2016); Bardhan (2016); Johnson and Koyama (2017).
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geography normally being on either side of the debate.6 However, it is becoming increasingly
clear that both institutions and geography matter, that they can influence each other, and that
each can matter more or less given a myriad of other circumstances. The findings of this paper
are very much in line with these ideas. Geography clearly mattered since, in addition to any
direct effects of endowments on development, the distribution of slaves was determined at least
in part by geographical features. At the same time, the salience of geographical characteristics
changed over time because of the gradual decline and eventual abolition of slavery over the
course of the 19th century.7 The result of this is that frontier areas involved in the latter part
of the coffee boom in Brazil relied less and for a shorter time-span on slave labour compared
to areas experiencing earlier commodity cycles. In turn, these developments helped to shape
local institutions. This supports the idea that, as argued by North, Summerhill, and Weingast
(2000) and Nugent and Robinson (2010), endowments transform themselves into political and
economic outcomes through complex and non-linear mechanisms and that similar endowments
need not yield the same outcomes.
Fourth, this paper speaks to the literature on the economic effects of immigration in Brazil.
In terms of findings, it shares similarities with de Carvalho Filho and Monasteiro (2012) and
Rocha, Ferraz, and Soares (2017), who show that the creation of foreign migrant communities
in the the late 19th and early 20th century – in Sa˜o Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul respectively
– led to a persistent increase in economic development.8 However, my work draws a crucial
distinction between the various phases of immigrant settlement, finding the first wave, – which
took place while slavery still existed – to be the key one. Furthermore, it offers a fully-fledged
identification strategy to deal with the potentially non-random location of the settler colonies.
3 Historical background
3.1 Structural change and slavery
Brazil’s economy in the 19th century experienced deep and long-lived structural changes. The
key development of this period was a permanent shift in the center of gravity of the Brazilian
economy from the Northeastern sugar-producing regions to the Southeastern coffee-growing
provinces. Although the process possibly began earlier with the discovery of gold in Minas
Gerais, the coffee boom was instrumental in bringing it to fruition (Klein and Luna, 2010).9
The Southeastern provinces of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo benefitted hugely
from these developments. Sa˜o Paulo, in particular, became an economic powerhouse thanks to
6See Nunn (2009) for a discussion.
7The delayed settlement of some areas of the country was furthermore attributable to the late and slow diffusion
of railways in Brazil, which, in turn, was mainly due to financial and political factors.
8On the positive effects of immigrant settlement in Brazil, see also Stolz, Baten, and Botelho (2013) and Witzel
de Souza (2016).
9Rough estimates indicate that per capita income in the Northeast fell by 30% between 1822 and 1913. The
disastrous performance of the region was driven by the poor performance of the region’s two main exports:
cotton and sugar. While in 1822 sugar represented 49% of Brazil’s exports and coffee 19%, by 1913 cotton and
sugar combined were only 3% of Brazil’s exports while coffee accounted for 60% (Leff, 1997).
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the coffee boom. By the late 19th century, it had come to dominate coffee production in Brazil,
and Brazil dominated coffee production in the world. Around the same time, other forms
of economic activity started to flourish as well, with new domestically financed and owned
industries taking root precisely in the regions that benefitted the most from growing exports
and foreign capital inflows in the late 19th and early 20th century (Haber, 1997). By 1940 the
state was the country’s most important industrial and financial centre. Today, the Southeast is
still the richest region in Brazil, while the Northeastearn sugar regions remain relatively poor.
There are indications that path dependency also worked at a more micro level. Monasteiro
(2010) finds almost no instances of “reversal of fortunes” in the income per capita of Brazilian
municipalities between 1872 and 2000.
Changes in the economy were mirrored by changes in the structure of the population. After
Independence in 1822, slaves were concentrated in the province of Rio de Janeiro, in the sugar-
growing regions of the Northeast and in the gold-mining areas of Minas Gerais. However, as
coffee production spread across the Southeast, areas suitable for coffee production started to
acquire slaves in substantial amounts (Leff, 1997; da Costa, 2000). As shown in Figure 1, slave
arrivals were at an all-time high in the 19th century – more than one third of all slaves having
entered Brazil did so between 1811 and 1856 (Slenes, 2010) – and, already by 1820, most slaves
disembarked in Southeastern ports.
Figure 1: Number of slaves disembarked in Brazil per decade and area of arrival, 1510-1870
Source: Voyages Database: The Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database (2009)
At the same time, as the 19th century progressed, mounting pressure from Britain made the
continuation of slavery increasingly difficult. The slave trade to British colonies was abolished
in 1807 and in 1815 it became illegal north of the equator. In 1831, British insistence led
to the adoption of a first law abolishing the slave trade in Brazil. This, however, had little
practical consequence on the actual inflow of slaves due to the lack of a real political desire
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to end slavery and to the inability of the government to impose its will on the oligarchs that
dominated the provinces both politically and administratively. So, the slave trade continued
practically unabated and actually grew in numbers as coffee plantations boosted demand for
labour (da Costa, 2000). In 1850, however, the international slave trade was finally de facto
abolished through the implementation of severe and effective measures against smuggling, which
continued at a drastically reduced rate for a number of years before disappearing altogether.
Once again British influence was decisive for this outcome (Fausto, 1999).
Despite these developments, coffee growing continued to rely heavily on slave labour after its
initial expansion in the 1830s. The main production centre in this early phase, which reached
its peak around 1850, was the Para´ıba Valley, located across the border of Sa˜o Paulo and Rio
de Janeiro (Fausto, 1999). Over time, the heartland of coffee production shifted dramatically
away from the Para´ıba Valley towards the north and west of Sa˜o Paulo and towards Minas
Gerais (Klein and Luna, 2010).
Slave imports from abroad were complemented and eventually substituted by the internal
reallocation of slaves to the coffee-growing regions. This remained important from 1850 until
the abolition of the transfer of slaves across provinces in the late 1870s. Thus, while in 1823
Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Sa˜o Paulo held around 386,000 slaves and the Northeastern
provinces of Bahia, Pernambuco and Maranha˜o held around 484,000, in 1872 the traditional
sugar-growing regions held 346,000 slaves and the coffee regions approximately 800,000 (Slenes,
1975; Klein, 1978). Even with slave numbers in sharp decline, the slave population in the
fast growing West of Sa˜o Paulo grew by 15% between 1874 and 1883, while decreasing in
absolute numbers in older coffee-growing regions (Klein and Luna, 2010). The expansion of
coffee production also had consequences beyond areas where the plantations could be found.
Minas’s economy, for example, continued to employ large numbers of slaves throughout the 19th
century outside the export sector. These were mostly employed in the production of foodstuffs
and textiles for the rapidly growing coffee regions (Slenes, 2010).
Notwithstanding this large internal reallocation of slaves, the huge expansion in coffee pro-
duction, the high mortality rates of the slaves and the abolition of slave imports meant that
coerced labour became increasingly inadequate to satisfy the labour demand of the Southeast.
Moreover, the Lei do Ventre Libre (Law of the Free Womb) of 1871 marked the beginning of
a strong abolitionist movement within Brazil. Although the law had a small direct impact,
since most children technically born free were forced to remain with their masters until they
turned 21, there were substantial indirect effects. Self purchase by the slaves increased, third
party interventions to free slaves became more common, and active legal actions by the slaves
to obtain freedom were more likely to be successful. The rapid increase in abolitionist senti-
ment, combined with increasing slave revolts and successful escapes, eventually culminated in
the abolition of slavery in 1888 (Klein and Luna, 2010).
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3.2 The Quilombos
3.2.1 A proxy for the long-term incidence of slavery
One of the most widespread and visible forms of resistance to slavery – common throughout
South America and the Caribbean – was the formation of permanent settlements by runaway
slaves. These are known as Quilombos in Brazil.10
With the democratic constitution of 1988, exactly 100 years after the abolition of slavery, the
Brazilian government started the process of formally recognizing these communities – formally
knows as comunidades remanescentes de Quilombo (remaining Quilombo communities) – in
association with the granting of some land rights. Only recently, the government has also
enacted programs to provide economic support to these often relatively poor communities.
Nearly 440 Quilombos have been certified so far by the Fundac¸a˜o Cultural Palmares in Minas
Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo. It should be noted that while all these communities have
been linked to resistance to slavery and are made up of the descendants of African slaves,
not all might be the direct offspring of communities formed by runaway slaves while slavery
still existed. Some were probably formed by marginalized freedmen or ex-slaves pre and post-
Abolition (Mattos, 2005-06; Programa Brasil Quilombola, 2013). For an analytical discussion
and history of the process through which Quilombo communities are certified, see Farfa´n-Santos
(2015).
Given the absence of systematic information on the distribution of slaves in earlier periods
or on escaped slave communities while slavery still existed, I propose using the presence of
certified Quilombo communities in modern-day Brazil as a proxy for the spatial distribution
of slaves over the long-run. The question remains of whether the location of communities
descending from Quilombos contains information regarding the spatial distribution of slavery
in the past. While it appears fairly non-controversial that the presence of large-scale slavery
made the emergence of Quilombos more likely, there are three main potential issues. First, if
runaway slaves traveled far enough to cross municipal borders, this would reduce the strength
of the relationship between the incidence of slavery and the presence of Quilombos, rendering
the latter a weak proxy. More worryingly, if runaway slaves actively sought out areas with
a low incidence of slavery (or with other specific characteristics related to both slavery and
economic development), the use of Quilombos as a proxy for slavery would actually lead to
bias. Finally, the survival of Quilombo communities until today may have been affected by
some factors related to economic development other than the incidence of slavery. This would,
once again, lead to bias in the results.
Three main elements help dispel worries and indicate that the presence of Quilombo descen-
dants does, in fact, carry useful information. The first is that geographical reach of runaway
slaves was limited. The vast geographical expanse of Brazil reduced the possibility that slaves
10Alternatively as Mocambos; Maroons in English. It should be noted that not all slave escapes shared the same
objectives. A clear distinction can be drawn between what is known as Petit Marronage – temporary escapes
to obtain something in return from an owner (the vast majority) – and Grand Marronage – permanent escapes
with the objective of forming or joining a Quilombo, entering society as an alleged freedman (Forro), or taking
a ship back to Africa (Flory, 1979; Florentino and Amantino, 2012).
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on the run could go far enough to cross municipal borders. On some occasions, runaway slaves
did reach far-removed and specific locations, but this took place under particular circumstances,
such as those prevailing in the 1880s when active abolitionists provided contacts and shelter
along particular escapes routes (Machado, 2006). Secondly, and more importantly, as the dis-
cussion below will show, the incentive to abandon the geographical vicinity of the location of
slaves’ captivity was not as clear as could be imagined. Slaves faced a trade-off between running
far from their masters and maintaining ties to society, particularly with other slaves from the
estate or area of their captivity. These ties were often essential for the survival of Quilombos,
making it costly for slaves to sever them. Moreover, distancing themselves from their masters
offered no guarantee of freedom, given that the task of recapturing slaves was often given to
wandering adventurers. At the same time, masters were often cautious about attempts at re-
capture, fearing damage to their ”property“ (i.e. the slaves). Thirdly, the role of confounding
economic factors in determining Quilombo creation and survival, as well as economic develop-
ment, can be captured effectively by controlling for the incidence of commodity cycles and other
key variables.
These considerations are supported by empirical evidence, which I present in Section 6.1. I
find Quilombos to be more common in areas associated with slave-intensive economic activities,
such as gold-mining and the early coffee boom. Moreover, I show that Quilombo municipalities
possessed large populations of free Afro-Brazilians in 1872, indicating a clear link with a past of
large-scale slavery. I further show that these same features are poorly captured by information
on slave numbers contained in the 1872 census. The census falls right in the middle of the deep
structural changes discussed above. This means that, while an invaluable source, it does not
capture the long-term presence and impact of slavery across Brazil, but rather a snapshot of an
institution in transition and on the cusp of its twilight phase.
3.2.2 The functioning of Quilombos
The desire to flee amongst slaves was general and widespread, but the possibility to do so varied
across space and time, with economic decline and a myriad other factors potentially playing
a role (Flory, 1979). Successful escapes sometimes led to the creation of stable communities,
which, in their early phase of existence, often required self-sufficiency and isolation from the
rest of society for survival (Florentino and Amantino, 2012). For this reason, they were usually
set-up in relatively remote areas, beyond the immediate reach of the planters and the author-
ities. However, Quilombos also emerged near or within densely populated urban areas, as the
Quilombo of Leblon – located on the outskirts of the city of Rio de Janeiro – and the Quilombos
of Jabaquara and Vila Matias – located in Sa˜o Paulo’s main port city of Santos – demonstrate.11
11For some background on the Quilombo of Jabaquara, see Machado (2006). The outskirts of Rio also housed
other Quilombos, such as those located in the Tijuca forest (Amantino, 2003). Swamps and forested areas repre-
sented ideal places for Quilombos, as they guaranteed some degree of concealment and resources such as wood,
hunting and fishing. Brazil’s vast frontier territory offered ample opportunities for such settlements. Indigenous
communities also tended to be located in these areas, which were beyond the reach of the state until, at least, the
late 19th century. They represented at the same time allies and rivals for Quilombo inhabitants. Coastal areas
near the location of clandestine landings after the 1831 law also saw the developments of numerous Quilombos.
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While many Quilombos were extremely small – containing less than 12 fugitives – and
survived for only brief periods of time, some became large and long-lasting communities. The
best-known case is that of Palmares (ca. 1605-1694), which, at its height, was home to nearly
11,000 individuals (Florentino and Amantino, 2012). Many other Quilombos long outlived
Palmares, eventually becoming integrated in society as neighborhoods, villages, towns and cities,
while often also preserving some cultural link to their past. With time, some even became
independent municipalities, like Muzambinho, in Southern Minas Gerais.
As they developed into stable communities, thanks to new arrivals and organic growth,
Quilombos could not survive in isolation (Klein and Luna, 2010). In fact, it was economic
and social ties with the rest of society that allowed Quilombos to survive by furnishing goods
that could not be produced in these communities and by warning them of incoming attacks
(Flory, 1979; Amantino, 2003). In fact, while the history of Palmares, led early historiography
to generalize the Quilombo experience as one of violent resistance, isolation and self-sufficiency,
more recent work indicates that most Quilombos were not located far from the rest of society and
were engaged in close commercial and social exchanges with it (Flory, 1979; Schmitt, Turatti,
and de Carvalho, 2002; Slenes, 2010; Farfa´n-Santos, 2015). Even Palmares maintained regular
and important social and commercial relations with the outside world (Anderson, 1996; Funari
and de Carvalho, 2005).
Moreover, while Quilombos did generally face the threat of destruction, this was less common
than one would think. The fear of killing valuable slaves and the fact that Quilombos at times
acted as a reservoir of labour that could not be employed at all times, thus reducing the burden
of subsistence placed on the masters, are two compelling explanations of why many Quilombos
were allowed to exist and persist (Flory, 1979).
Successful Quilombos also developed a considerable degree of economic complexity. As Flory
(1979, page 120-121) puts it: “Some were productive enough to produce the large surpluses that
decamping fugitives left behind them when threatened. Some Brazilian mocambos included
machinery and possessed a division of labor based on a technology that cannot have been much
less advanced than that employed in regular society. [...] Some Brazilian quilombo economies
mirrored the white economies from which they sprang to such an extent that it is misleading to
think of them as discrete entities rather than ‘outlaw’ parts of a single economy”. The Quilombo
do Ambro´sio in 18th century Minas Gerais, for example, had sugar mills and other equipment
related to the refinement of sugar, the fermentation of cane liquor and the production of manioc
flour. Another Quilombo possessed more than 6,000 coffee trees, making it equivalent to a small
Information on runaway slaves mostly comes from post-mortem inventories and announcements in newspapers
and is extremely incomplete. Nonetheless, there appears to be a correlation between the intensity of the slave
trade and escapes. This is inferred by the fact that newly arrived slaves tended to figure disproportionally in
reports about escaped slaves (Florentino and Amantino, 2012). There also appears to be an inverse correlation
between the frequency of manumissions (alforrias) and the number of escaped slaves (Merrick and Graham,
1981). Those who escaped tended to be men rather than women, beyond what would be expected based solely
on the gender imbalance in the slave population. They also tended to be West Africans from the areas of
modern-day Congo and Angola (Florentino and Amantino, 2012). Other predominant groups of fugitives were
Mozambicans and, in the case of Southeastern Brazil, Creoles originally from the Northeast and South of the
country.
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plantation (Flory, 1979).
Finally, while mainly composed of runaway slaves and freedmen, not all Quilombolas were
necessarily slaves or even blacks. Poor whites and indigenous people were also present across
these communities (Flory, 1979; Anderson, 1996; Amantino, 2003; Funari and de Carvalho,
2005).
Modern anthropological work on Quilombo descendants supports many of the conclusions
drawn by historians regarding these communities and their relation to the rest of society. For
example Schmitt, Turatti, and de Carvalho (2002, page 6, author’s translation) state: “[...]
one should not imagine that the rural black communities have resisted in their lands until
today because they remained isolated, at the margin of society. On the contrary, they always
had intense and asymmetric relationships with Brazilian society, resisting to various forms of
violence to remain in their territories, or, at least, in part of them.”
3.3 Immigration and free labour
With the decline of slavery, planters and policymakers started to look for alternatives to coerced
labour. The province of Sa˜o Paulo, with its rapidly expanding coffee plantations, was at the
forefront of experiments with the subsidization of immigrants to form colonies. The provin-
cial government cooperated with private individuals to promote the settling of Europeans on
Paulista plantations as early as 1829, and more vigorously from the 1840s (da Costa, 2000).
However, by the second half of the 1850s, discontent was being voiced by both planters and
colonists. Notwithstanding high slave prices attributable to the abolition of the slave trade,
planters still tended to prefer slave labour to that of free colonists.12
Although there were exceptions to this generally negative experience, and some continued to
promote the settling of immigrants, planters seemed ill-equipped to deal with the peculiarities of
free labour. A common point of contention was the tendency of settlers to refuse to work when
dissatisfied. And dissatisfied they often were: with the terms of their contracts, with their living
quarters, with their confinement to the plantations, and with the tasks of repairing roads and
other infrastructure, which they saw as falling outside their contracts. Moreover, Catholicism
was the only recognized religion in the country, while protestantism was the chief cult amongst
Swiss and German colonists. This created further frictions with the planters (da Costa, 2000).
Another cause of discontent, which also reveals that both planters and the authorities intended
the colonists to be a direct replacement for slaves by tying them to the plantations, was the fact
that immigrants who received subsidies to relocate to Brazil were barred from buying land for
three years after their arrival (Fausto, 1999).13
Against this backdrop, settlers abandoning the plantations with unfulfilled contracts and
outright revolts became frequent (da Costa, 2000). Sending countries were also worried about
the conditions of migrants to Brazil, particularly those residing in colonies and working on
12Not all colonists were perceived equally. In general, Portuguese settlers appear to have been preferred for
plantation work than the other two major colonist nationalities of the time: Swiss and Germans (da Costa,
2000).
13This provision became effective with the approval of the 1850 Law on Land.
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coffee plantations. Growing concerns in Italy, for example, eventually led to the “Decreto
Prinetti” of 1902, which made subsidized emigration from Italy illegal, and was targeted mainly
at migration to Brazil. Prussia nominally prohibited emigration to Brazil as early as 1859, and
similar measures were implemented for the whole German empire from 1871 (Fausto, 1999).
Figure 2: Immigration to Sa˜o Paulo, 1830-1930
Source: Cameron (1931)
These first timid instances of large-scale European immigration were followed by much more
substantial developments. The economic changes of the second half of the 1800s had a profound
impact on free labour. Besides improvement in transportation, machinery started being intro-
duced on coffee plantations and coffee prices worldwide were generally high. This shifted the
balance in favor of free labour and specialization. Nonetheless, obstacles to the widespread
diffusion of agricultural free labour, including traditional sharecropping arrangements, still pre-
vailed initially. This led to both the perpetuation of slavery in traditional coffee and sugar
producing regions and the reallocation of more slaves from declining areas to booming ones.
Only when the abolition of slavery was looming large, did interest in importing free labour
become strong again. Between 1872 and 1885, 42,000 mostly Italian and Portuguese immi-
grants entered Sa˜o Paulo. In 1886-87, 122,000 entered the province, and 800,000 more in the
following decade (da Costa, 2000). Between 1885 and 1909, a total of around 2.8 million Euro-
pean migrants entered Brazil and the majority went to satisfy the demand for labour of coffee
plantations, industries and other activities in the Southeast (Figure 2).14
Thus, eventually, the project of substituting slaves with immigrants was a success. This
success was helped by heavy state intervention. Monetary incentives and propaganda both
14Most other immigrants settled in the southern provinces of Santa Catarina, Parana´ and Rio Grande do Sul.
There, they generally received land and set up their own communities instead of substituting slave labour on
plantations (Leff, 1997).
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Figure 3: First edition of the magazine O Immigrante, January 1908
Source: Arquivo pu´blico do estado de Sa˜o Paulo
played a role. The virtues of migrating to Brazil were extolled in Europe via pamphlets and
other publications exemplified by the magazine O Immigrante (The Immigrant) published for
the first time in 1908 by the Secretaria da Agricultura (Department of Agriculture) of Sa˜o
Paulo in six languages: Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, French, German and Polish (Figure 3).
Planters lobbied both the central government and the provincial government of Sa˜o Paulo to
subsidize immigration. This led to the government generally fronting the cost of the voyage
for the immigrants. Apart from increasing the net private return of moving to Brazil, this
helped to overcome credit constraints faced by potential immigrants that might otherwise have
prevented them from undertaking the trip. For a limited time, the Imperial government also
paid a small daily wage to colonists. However, by 1900 push factors in Europe were so strong
that the majority of immigrant arrivals were unsubsidized (Cameron, 1931).
Settler colonies also continued to be created in this latter stage. Although these later
communities are generally considered to have been more successful than earlier experiments,
the general experience with this type of subsidized migration was not considered particularly
fruitful (Cameron, 1931). I will use settler colonies in my empirical analysis below, showing
that, despite the negative perceptions, the inflow of immigrants they facilitated had profound
positive effects on the trajectory of municipalities containing these communities. Surprisingly, I
find that the earlier, and supposedly most problematic, colonies had the largest positive effects.
I link this to the fact that settler colonies led to inflows of free workers allowing an earlier exit
from slave-based production. Moreover, in sharp contrast to slaves, immigrants had a political
voice and could “vote with their feet”. This had important repercussions on processes such as
the creation of more efficient markets for free labour and the provision of public goods.
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The Abolition of slavery ended the contrast between slave and free labour, while chain migra-
tion, better information and more experience on the part of the authorities made immigration
from Europe a true mass-phenomenon. This all contributed to reduce the geographical con-
straints on the settlement of foreign migrants leading to large aggregate effects on development.
However, while mass-immigration post-1888 clearly played a fundamental role in changing the
face of Brazil’s economy and society, it does not seem to have produced the same effects in
terms of spatial inequality at the micro-municipal level that the first wave of immigration did.
4 Empirical strategy
Empirically, this paper has three goals: 1) showing that Quilombos can act as a proxy for the
intensity of slavery, 2) assessing the impact of slavery on economic development both while
slavery still existed – in 1872 – and after its abolition – in 1920-23; 2) evaluating the impact
of immigration while slavery still existed vis-a´-vis that of successive waves. For the final part
of the analysis, I consider outcomes in 1908-12 alongside those of 1920-23 for reasons that will
become apparent during the description of the identification strategy.
In order to capture as many facets as possible of the process of economic development,
given the available data, I consider the following outcomes. For 1872, I analyze: literacy, school
attendance, population density and a proxy of state capacity: the number of public employees
per capita. For 1920-3, I look at: literacy, wages, population density and an indicator of
fiscal/state capacity: public expenditure per capita. Due to data availability, I am only able to
look at fiscal/state capacity as proxied by revenue/expenditure per capita in 1908-12.
Regarding geographical focus, I concentrate on three key provinces/states – Minas Gerais,
Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo – located in the Southeastern region of the country. As discussed,
these were at the center of the structural changes of the 19th century and experienced very
heterogeneous historical trajectories in relation to slavery and economic development, which fa-
cilitate the investigation of the impact of slavery. They are also amongst Brazil’s most populous
regions both today and in the past.15
4.1 Identifying the impact of slavery
Besides the issue of measurement introduced above and discussed further in Section 6.1, an-
alyzing the impact of slavery on development presents other challenges. The main one is the
non-randomness of the distribution of both slaves and Quilombos. While the most plausible
direction of this bias is upwards, due to booming parts of the country acquiring more slaves,
there is also evidence that declining areas held on to a slave-based mode of production longer
than more dynamic areas, making the overall direction of potential bias unclear a priori. With
regard to the relationship between Quilombos and fiscal/state capacity, there is also the possi-
bility that Quilombos survived in areas of the country where the control of the state was less
15Today, they are the three most populous states in Brazil. While in 1872 Minas Gerais was the most populous
province, with Sa˜o Paulo and Rio in 4th and 5th position respectively, after Bahia and Pernambuco.
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strong, which would mean the presence of reverse causality.16
A straightforward solution to address these issues is to control for variables able to capture
differences across municipalities related to the incidence of slave labour, the survival of Quilom-
bos and development. In order to avoid bias, I need only account for factors that affected the
explanatory variables, as well as the outcomes, up until the period in which I observe the out-
comes themselves. This is because successive developments are unrelated to the outcomes and
thus not a source of bias. The wide range of controls employed in the estimations is described
in detail throughout the analysis in Section 6. I also employ propensity score matching as an
alternative estimating strategy to standard regressions in order to draw inference based on the
comparison between municipalities that are very similar in all but the presence of Quilombos.
It should be noted, however, that reverse causality between various aspects of development
and the presence of Quilombos is not a major worry in this context, given the link between
the presence of Quilombos and economic activities – such as gold extraction and the early
coffee boom – which by the late 19th and early 20th century had lost most economic relevance.
To further dispel worries, I control directly for the influence of these economic activities and,
thus, their legacy. Additionally, I account for the ability of the authorities to crack down on
Quilombos by proxying the coercive power of the state with the presence of soldiers and justice
workers in a municipality.
Regarding the survival of Quilombos, one of the biggest – and most relevant – threats to
their survival was the desire to reclaim land and labour for agricultural use, most importantly
for coffee production. As Flory (1979, page 125-26) puts it: “Why were some quilombos de-
stroyed while others were spared or even protected? One answer to the question of hostility has
previously been suggested in the obverse of our generalizations about the economic bases of such
communities; that is, economic rivalries or competition for resources and markets might have
16Another potentially confounding factor is the siza tax, which was applied to transactions of immobile goods.
Its standard rate was 10%, but its extension to the internal slave trade was with a rate of 5% (meia siza). The
tax concerned transactions of Brazilian-born slaves (but really this meant slaves not newly entered in Brazil)
and was introduced alongside a number of new taxes, between 1801 and 1814. These were all applied uniformly
across the country giving, for the first time, a degree of fiscal uniformity to the (then) Portuguese colony (Costa,
2005; Rodrigues, Craig, Schmidt, and Santos, 2015). Part of the reason for its introduction was paying for
the arrival of the Portuguese court in Brazil in 1808 (Abreu and do Lago, 2001; Fernandes, 2005). This tax
became particularly important after the abolition of the international slave trade in 1850, both as a source of
revenue for provinces and for the purpose of slowing down the transfer of slaves to the booming coffee growing
regions. This was important because of the belief that an excessive transfer of slaves out of the Northeast
would lead to growing support in the region for the abolition of the institution. The Ato Adicional of 1834 had
devolved the administration of the tax to provincial governments (Costa, 2005) and the large reallocation of
slaves from the Northeast to the Southeast meant that the number of transactions in this latter area increased
greatly. The tax was levied on the final price of slaves in the purchasing region (Klein and Luna, 2010), thus
increasing the oversight of the state and of local governments, as well as their ability to tax. Additionally, from
1884 transactions involving slaves had to obligatorily go through public courts and slaves became subject to
registration. These reforms were introduced in order to reduce tax evasion of both the meia siza and on taxes on
slaves in urban areas. They appear to have been quite effective in raising fiscal revenue, but were not uniformly
successful across Brazil. In Rio Grande do Sul, the changes were implemented with little resistance and further
taxes on slavery were introduced, amongst other reasons, to help subsidize European immigration (Costa, 2005).
In a number of states in the North, the tax was substituted with levies on slaves sold outside the provinces.
Following the obligation of registration, Minas Gerais simply abolished the meia siza. In Sa˜o Paulo, the meia
siza was suspended for a period in 1849-50, and the registration of slaves was imperfectly implemented (Costa,
2005). For this reason, it does not represent a particular problem for the analysis in this paper.
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led here, as they did elsewhere, to expropriation. Such reasoning also suggests an explanation
of the timing of quilombo destruction, and ties those events to the demographic, social and
economic development of the society at large”. Thus, accounting for the expansion of the coffee
frontier, as I do, likely accounts for a large share of the non-random survival of Quilombos.
Additionally, I control for further geographical and other variables, related to the production
possibilities of municipalities.
4.2 Identifying the impact of immigration
The main challenge in testing the impact of immigration is that immigrants, like slaves, were
not randomly distributed across Brazil’s municipalities. Endogeneity concerns are harder to
dismiss compared to the case of Quilombos, given that the economic developments that attracted
migrants are contemporaneous, or briefly preceded the outcomes I observe.
In order to deal with this issue, I rely on the location of settler colonies set up by the na-
tional/provincial governments of Sa˜o Paulo in conjunction with private companies and planters
to proxy the location of migrants. Municipalities with settler colonies were undoubtedly more
likely to attract migrants both directly – the colonies were created through government-subsidized
arrivals of Europeans – and indirectly – through migrant networks and family re-conjunctions –
than similar municipalities without settler colonies. The problem remains that settler colonies
might not have been created randomly. Although it does not appear that they were located
in particularly favorable locations (Cameron, 1931), the worry remains they were placed in
municipalities with more growth potential.
In order to achieve identification, I divide the colonies in three groups: 1) those created
while slavery still existed (1829-89); 2) those created between the end of slavery and when I
observe my outcomes (1890-1912); 3) those created after my period of observation (1913-38).
The colonies are detailed in Figure 4. I pick 1908-12 as the date in which I observe my outcomes,
rather than 1920-23, to ensure a meaningful number of placebo colonies exist.
Group 1 serves as my proxy for immigration while slavery still existed. Group 2 is meant to
capture whether the migration wave that took place after the end of slavery had the same impact
as the previous one. Finding a different effect would suggest that the contrast between slave and
free immigrant labour is a crucial component of the impact of immigration on development in
Brazil. Group 3 serves as a placebo: finding a positive effect of these colonies on my outcomes
would be a strong signal that these were simply placed in more favorable locations, and that my
identification strategy is not valid. Importantly, there is no evidence of a discontinuity in the
creation of these colonies between the three periods. If anything, colonies set up in later periods
were considered more successful thanks to improvements in the design of settler contracts and
of conditions on plantations. This would actually bias the results against the hypothesis that
the initial immigration wave was the crucial one.
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Figure 4: The location of settler colonies in Sa˜o Paulo, 1829-1938
Source: Gagliardi (1958). The creation of colonies in 1829-1888 was overseen by the imperial government, in
1889-1912 by the provincial government, while in 1913-38 all except two, which were overseen by the Federal
government, were also the responsibility of the provincial government.
5 Data
I rely on data from three cross sections in the analysis: 1872, 1908-1912 and 1920-23. This
is partly motivated by data availability. Fortunately, however, these dates also capture three
fundamental junctures in Brazilian history. The 1872 data, for example, captures the peak of
slave numbers in Southeastern Brazil, as well as the first phase of the deep structural changes
to hit the country in the second half of the 19th century.
The 1908-12 and 1920-23 cross-sections are ideal for the analysis, for several reasons. First,
they are temporally far enough from the abolition of slavery in 1888 to assess the persistence of
its impact. At the same time, they are not too far removed to plausibly argue for its existence.
Second, they lie at the heart of Brazil’s Old Republic era (1889-1930). This was a period of
relative decentralization, which means that local governments were important actors within
the public sector. The early 20th century was also characterized by marked improvements
and expansions in municipal public services in Sa˜o Paulo (Rowe, 1908), making this period
particularly meaningful. Third, the 1908-12 data encapsulates the final stage of pre-WWI mass
migration from Europe to Brazil. Given the importance of migration in my story, it is crucial
that my period of observation encompasses this migratory flow. Finally, coffee prices, which
presumably had an important impact on development and could thus influence my results, were
close to their long-run average in these periods (Figure 5).
I draw from numerous data sources. I summarize the most important here, while Appendix
A provides a full description.
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Figure 5: Coffee Prices, 1870-1939
Source: Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007)
5.1 The explanatory variables: slavery and Quilombos
Figure 6 illustrates the two measures of the intensity of slavery I employ: the incidence of
slaves in the total population in 1872 and the presence and number of Quilombos present in
each municipality. The 1872 data comes from Brazil’s first country-wide census (Brazil, 1876).
Data on the location of Quilombos comes from the government agency responsible for their
certification: the Fundac¸a˜o Cultural Palmares. The borders of the municipalities are those of
1920 (IBGE, 2011). I use these as my units of observation throughout the analysis to ensure
the comparability of the results across the three time periods.
The variation across municipalities is very large: slaves made up from around 1% of the
population to nearly 63%. Quilombos also offer a large degree of spatial variation. The majority
of municipalities contain zero communities, while others have over 20. Unsurprisingly, given the
association with colonial gold production, Minas Gerais contains the most Quilombos – 303 in
total, 1.7 per municipality, on average – while Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo have 30 and 105
respectively – 0.5 per municipality on average.
5.2 The outcomes
5.2.1 Fiscal/state capacity
As discussed in the introduction of the paper, local level fiscal and state capacity have consti-
tuted an important factor in Brazil’s economic history, both as indicators of development and
as measures of the quality of institutions and public goods provision. During Brazil’s consti-
tutional monarchy (1822-1889), which followed independence from Portugal, municipalities –
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Figure 6: Slave ratio in 1872 and Quilombos in modern-day Brazil
Sources: the slave ratio is calculated based on data from Brazil (1876), the Quilombos’s location is provided by
the Fundac¸a˜o Cultural Palmares and the 1920 boundaries are from (IBGE, 2011).
Brazil’s smallest administrative units – had very little autonomy. They relied on provincial gov-
ernments for the approval of municipal regulations and the appointment of local functionaries.
Decisions regarding local budgets also had to be approved by the provincial assembly. Indeed,
despite its size, Brazil was a very centralized country that left municipalities little power or
resources of their own. On top of this, the rural oligarchies who controlled provincial and na-
tional governments, also had a strong influence on municipal affairs, a phenomenon known as
Coronelismo (Nunes Leal, 1977).17
However, people were not entirely powerless, even under very adverse conditions of isola-
tion, poverty and illiteracy. Colistete (2017) shows that, in 19th century Sa˜o Paulo, citizens
successfully lobbied the provincial government through municipal assemblies for the installation
of primary schools, for example.
The financial and political position of Brazilian municipalities changed slowly, but steadily
over time, particularly following the Ato Adicional (Additional Act) of 1834. This gave provinces
17The term Coronel (colonel) in this context is not tied to the military. It is a term used to identify influential
local figures and oligarchs who traditionally bought posts in the National Guard. In the more remote areas of
the country, the hold on power of the coronels on administrative processes and law enforcement was practically
complete. The population turned to local oligarchs offering votes in exchange for aid and protection, in a classic
example of clientelism and patronage. In this context, boundaries between the public and the private tended to be
blurred as public funds were used for private interests and private funds used for civic improvements. Moreover,
the impersonality needed for bureaucratic efficiency was rare (da Costa, 2000). The situation was only marginally
different in important coastal cities and other urban centers. There, other power groups, such as merchants and
professionals, exerted influence alongside traditional elites (Woodard, 2005). Interestingly, neither the oligarchs
nor their clients appointed to public administration were particularly interested in expanding the revenue of
the municipalities since their main interest lay in power and authority, rather than in direct embezzlement or
corruption involving public funds (Graham, 1990; Abreu and do Lago, 2001).
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legislative power over their own and municipal taxation and expenditure, on the condition that
these did not interfere with those of the central government (Abreu and do Lago, 2001). In
1826, shortly after independence, Brazilian municipalities raised essentially no revenue of their
own. By 1856, municipal revenue had reached around 3.3% of total public revenue and by 1885-
86 they stood at 5.2% (Sokoloff and Zolt, 2007).18 The end of the Monarchy in 1889 and the
creation of a more federalist republic in 1891 led to municipalities gaining prominence. During
what has become known as the Old Republic (1891-1930), mayors were elected rather than
appointed in most states, and the new Constitution established that provincial and municipal
ordinary budgets would have to fund primary education. Additionally, in booming regions of
the country, municipalities increased their revenue rapidly thanks to growing intakes from taxes
on coffee and on activities and professions (de Carvalho Filho and Colistete, 2010).
Even after these reforms, however, the distribution of public revenue across various levels of
government and the scarce resources commanded by municipalities continued to be a prominent
issue. In the late 19th and early 20th century, it was widely believed that Brazil’s municipalities,
particularly rural ones in the backlands, did not possess enough resources to provide basic
services like healthcare and education to the population. There was, moreover, a feeling that
large urban centers absorbed fiscal resources from peripheral regions and thus curbed their
development (Nunes Leal, 1977).19
Nonetheless, within a context of overall low public revenue, municipalities had become im-
portant players in the collection of tax revenue and the provision of public goods by the beginning
of the 20th century. Between 1907 and 1938, municipalities were responsible for around 15% of
total public revenue and 14% of total public expenditure on average. At the state level, munici-
palities produced 24% and 23% of total revenue and expenditure respectively, employed around
one third of all workers in civil administration, and were responsible for significant shares of
expenditure in key areas. As an example, in 1919-23 close to 20% of public expenditure on
education in some states and over 50% on average expenditure on public works were performed
by municipalities.
I have collected a number of variables, which have been used as proxies for fiscal and state
in previous research. For 1872, I use the number of public employees per 1000 citizens taken
from the census. For 1908-12, I analyze revenue and expenditure per capita taken from that
year’s statistical yearbook (Brazil, 1908-1912), which also contains population data. The 1920-
23 outcomes – public revenue and expenditure per capita – are from a special issue on public
finances (Brazil, 1926), while the population data is from IBGE (2011). All these variables offer
a vast degree of variation. For example, in 1923 municipal intakes and outlays ranged between
less than 0.2 milre´ıs per capita and more than 70, while public employees per 1000 citizens in
1872 varied between 0 and over 11.
18da Costa (2000) reports a lower figure, less than 3%
19In turn, the economic progress of the backlands came to be seen as necessary for the continued industrial
development of Sa˜o Paulo and Rio de Janeiro through the expansion of the domestic market, making the issue
salient for both central and state governments (Nunes Leal, 1977).
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5.2.2 Wages, literacy and population density
The other set of outcomes I analyze are indicators of the socio-economic conditions of the mu-
nicipalities. For 1872, these are: literacy, school attendance and population density constructed
using data from the census (Brazil, 1876) and IBGE’s maps (IBGE, 2011). Literacy is measured
as the share of the free population who could read and write. School attendance is the share of
non-slave children in school age (6 to 15 year olds) who attended school. For 1920-23 outcomes –
literacy, wages and population density – data comes from the 1920 census (Brazil, 1920a,b) and
IBGE’s maps and population data respectively. The maps are also used to measure population
density in 1912, in combination with population data from Brazil (1908-1912). The variable
is simply population divided by the area of the municipality. Wages refer to daily wages of
carpenters, which were the most widely reported.
This data also offers a very large degree of variation. In 1872 on average, around 14% of
the population of Minas Gerais, Sa˜o Paulo and Rio was literate, while 16% of those of school
age actually attended school. In the municipality with the lowest literacy around 2.5% of
the free population could read and write, while in the one with the highest over 42% could.
School attendance ranged between less than 1 and over 90% of eligible free children. Average
literacy in 1920 had risen, but only to 22%, while the dispersion was even larger than in 1872
– between 1.4% and 61% – presumably because ex-slaves were now included in the statistics.
A carpenter’s daily wage went from 3.5 milre´ıs to 15. Finally, some municipalities were very
sparsely populated, while others had high concentrations of population.
6 Analysis
6.1 Empirical evidence on slavery and Quilombos
In order to provide empirical evidence that Quilombos can indeed provide useful information
complementary to that of the census, I perform the following simple empirical exercise: I esti-
mate the relationship between three measures of the intensity of slavery – 1) the share of slaves
in the total population from the 1872 census (SlaveShare), 2) a dummy indicating the presence
of a Quilombo community in a municipality (QuilTreat), 3) a variable containing the number
of Quilombos in a municipality (QuilNumb) – and the presence of the three main economic
activities associated with large-scale slave labour: sugar production, gold extraction and the
coffee boom. Data on the historical location of the production of these commodities comes from
Naritomi, Soares, and Assunc¸a˜o (2012). The coffee boom is included through two separate vari-
ables: one identifying its early phase (up until 1886, essentially until the end of slavery), and
one capturing its full expansion up to 1935. This is done in order to distinguish the potentially
different relationship between the phases of coffee boom, the use of slavery and the presence of
Quilombos. I also include the share of the population constituted of free citizens of African de-
scent in 1872 (FreeAfricanDesc), alongside further controls, to capture areas where slavery was
widespread and deeply-rooted and which thus maintained large populations of Afro-Brazilians.
Finally, I insert a proxy for the reach of the coercive power of the state to ensure that my results
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(a) Literacy (b) School Attendance
(c) Public Employment (d) Population density
Figure 7: Outcomes distribution, 1872
Source: see text and Appendix A.
are not driven by Quilombos being simply located in remote areas with little or no control of
the authorities. This is the number of soldiers living in the municipality for every 1000 citizens.
The results are presented in Table 1. They indicate that the 1872 slave ratio is positively
correlated with early coffee production, which is unsurprising given the historical narrative
provided thus far. Colonial gold production, instead, is negatively correlated with 1872 slavery.
Again, this was expected: by the 19th century, gold extraction was an extremely marginal
economic activity and gold producing municipalities experienced large outflows of slaves towards
coffee and sugar producing regions, following the massive inflows of previous centuries. Sugar
production is not significantly correlated with the slave share, which is explained by the fact
that the commodity’s colonial heyday was long past, and that, out of the three provinces, only
Rio de Janeiro had ever cultivated it intensively enough to justify large-scale slavery.
The results for Quilombos are also very much in line with the historical narrative. I find that
these communities are more frequently found in areas where the coffee boom took hold prior
to the abolition of slavery. When the full expansion of coffee production is taken into account,
instead, the relationship turns negative. This was , once again, expected: early coffee production
looked similar to earlier commodity booms in its extractive nature and widespread use of slavery
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(a) Literacy (b) Wages
(c) Expenditure per capita (d) Population density
Figure 8: Outcomes distribution, 1920-23
Source: see text and Appendix A.
(Naritomi, Soares, and Assunc¸a˜o, 2012). When coffee production expanded to areas previously
devoid of plantation agriculture or barely even inhabited, however, slavery was in rapid decline
or already abolished. Thus, the use of slavery was both less intense and shorter-lived, drastically
reducing the probability of leading to the creation of permanent Quilombo communities.20
It is also clear that, in areas suitable for coffee production, planters had a strong interest
in claiming both land and slaves that could be put to work to produce this valuable cash
crop. This further decreased the likelihood of successful formation and survival of runaway
slave communities in newly settled and highly productive coffee areas. Interestingly, it was
not only actual coffee production that is associated with a lower incidence of Quilombos, but
also its potential. This is indicated by the strongly negative relationship between the presence
of Quilombos and the suitability of land for coffee production. It is not difficult to imagine
that slaves with experience in coffee production would have easily recognized and avoided areas
suitable for the crop fearing the successive expansion of plantations.
The results for QuilTreat and QuilNumb also indicate that these communities can be found
20On top of this, land suitable for coffee production is not ideal for the production of other crops, like cereals,
which would have been important for the survival of Quilombos.
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Table 1: Measuring slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES SlaveShare SlaveShare QuilTreat QuilTreat QuilNumb QuilNumb
Sugar 0.0158 0.00703 0.560 0.280 1.043 0.378
(0.0377) (0.0381) (0.886) (0.903) (0.868) (0.884)
Gold -0.0361*** -0.0346*** 0.719** 0.728** 1.767*** 1.582***
(0.0112) (0.0117) (0.300) (0.291) (0.455) (0.411)
CoffeEarly 0.0360** 0.530** 0.253
(0.0157) (0.257) (0.546)
CoffeeAll 0.00725 -0.164 -1.289**
(0.0215) (0.302) (0.571)
FreeAfricanDesc -0.119*** -0.127*** 2.340*** 2.081*** 5.606*** 4.145***
(0.0397) (0.0412) (0.797) (0.737) (1.159) (0.982)
Soldiers -0.00239 -0.00176 0.0376 0.0546* 0.0688 0.0824*
(0.00164) (0.00152) (0.0269) (0.0301) (0.0455) (0.0458)
Controls
Constant 3 3 3 3 3 3
PortDistance 3 3 3 3 3 3
LandSuit 3 3 3 3 3 3
ProvinceFE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 437 437 437 437 437 437
R2 0.487 0.474
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The three economic activity variables are dummies for the historical production of each commodity, see Naritomi,
Soares, and Assunc¸a˜o (2012). It should be noted that a variable containing only the further expansion of coffee
predicts perfectly the lack of Quilombo communities in a municipality. Distance from the port is to Santos or
Rio de Janeiro, whichever is closer to the centroid of each municipality. The land suitability indicators refer to
rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. Column 1 is estimated via OLS, column 2
via probit given that QuilTreat is binary, and column 3 using a negative binomial distribution since QuilNumb
is a count variable.
in areas historically associated with Gold extraction. Gold extraction relied extensively on slave
labour and, for this reason, Minas Gerais saw a massive and rapid inflow of slaves from the late
17th century. This increased the probability of the formation of Quilombos. The successive
decrease in importance of gold production and low suitability of the land for the production of
cash crops might have also facilitated their survival.
Quilombo municipalities also had larger populations of African descendants in 1872. This
further testifies their long-history of large-scale slavery. Despite internal migration, even to this,
day Afro-Brazilians can be found in greater numbers in areas where slavery was historically
prevalent.
The final key result of this exercise is that Quilombos cannot be found where the presence of
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the state was historically weak. Although weakly significant and small, the positive coefficients
of the Soldiers variable indicate that, if anything, the state’s coercive power was stronger in
Quilombo municipalities.
In summary, Quilombos communities do indeed provide complementary information to the
1872 census regarding slavery’s incidence across time and space. Whereas the 1872 census
mainly captures the changes brought about by the coffee boom, the runaway slave communities
capture the long-term incidence of the institution, closely connected to the early coffee boom
and colonial gold production, in other words, activities that, by the late 19th and early 20th
century, had lost their centrality in Brazil’s economy, but left a legacy of stable Quilombo
communities and large numbers of Afro-Brazilians.
6.2 The impact of slavery pre-Abolition
Having established the usefulness of Quilombos as a proxy for the incidence of slavery, I start
my analysis of the impact of slavery in 1872 by relating the number of Quilombos, normalized by
population (1000 citizens), to the four 1872 outcomes: literacy, school attendance, population
density and public employment. For each dependent variable, in the first column, I simply
control for province fixed effects, geographic characteristics and land suitability. In the second
column, I also control for the three economic activities most closely related to large-scale slavery:
colonial sugar production, colonial gold extraction and the coffee boom. This is to ensure that
I am capturing the effect of slavery and not simply the impact of economic activities related to
it, which might have influenced the outcomes though channels other than slavery.
In order to capture the probability of survival of Quilombo communities, which might oth-
erwise bias my results if also related to the dependent variables, I control for the expansion
of the coffee boom both before and after my period of observation. This is to ensure that the
places where coffee production took hold, and Quilombos were less likely to survive, are not
fundamentally different and more prone to economic development than other areas. Addition-
ally, I also insert my proxy for the coercive power of the state – the number of soldiers per
1000 citizens – in all regressions. The inclusion of an alternative proxy – the number of justice
workers per 1000 citizens – yields similar results.
For all outcomes except school attendance, I find a negative and statistically significant
relationship with the presence and number of Quilombos in both specifications. This suggests
that the incidence of slavery, captured by runaway slave communities, negatively affected de-
velopment. The magnitude of the findings is far from negligible. In the more conservative
specification, an additional Quilombo per 1000 citizens is estimated to have decreased literacy
by 8% (1.5 pp), population density by 12% and the number of public employees by 32%.
In order to test the robustness of the inference, I also rely on an alternative strategy:
propensity score matching. I do this to ensure that I am comparing only municipalities that are
very similar in all observable characteristics, except for the presence of a Quilombo community.
The logic of applying this particular methodology in this setting is that some municipalities
in Brazil had larger slave populations than others – leading to the more likely formation of a
Quilombo – and that this variation is random from the vantage point of the analysis, conditional
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Table 2: Standard regressions, 1872
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Literacy SchoolAttendance PopDensity PublicEmployment
QuilNumb/Pop -0.0147*** -0.0149*** -0.00652 -0.00684 -1.783*** -1.165* -0.314*** -0.294***
(0.00512) (0.00556) (0.00622) (0.00628) (0.679) (0.622) (0.0973) (0.0842)
µ DepVar 0.18 0.16 7.41 0.86
σ DepVar 0.10 0.12 10.11 1.22
Controls
Constant 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Soldiers 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
LandSuit 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
StateFE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
GeoControls 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Sugar 3 3 3 3
Gold 3 3 3 3
Coffee 3 3 3 3
Observations 437 437 437 437
R2 0.217 0.224 0.103 0.103 0.116 0.171 0.314 0.325
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Geographic controls include: distance from the equator, distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro
(whichever is closer to the centroid of the municipality), altitude, ruggedness and surface area, except for popu-
lation density for which area is excluded since it is part of the dependent variable. The regressions are run with
OLS.
on the observables used in the matching. In other words, once the impact of salient geographic
features – such as distance from the port – and economic characteristics – such as the history
of commodity production – are accounted for, the variation in slavery and Quilombos depends
on idiosyncratic factors. An example of these is different preferences for the use of slave vs free
labour between planters; as discussed above, some plantation owners were, indeed, committed
to using free labour for ideological more than practical reasons. Another example is the ease of
access to slave labour from other parts of the country, which presumably effected the intensity
of slave use, but is unrelated to other factors.
I detail the variables used in the propensity score calculations in Table 3. Before matching,
municipalities featuring Quilombos exhibit substantial differences compared to those that do
not. A number of variables stand out. As already discussed, Quilombo municipalities tend to
be located in old gold producing areas; at the same time, they are less likely to be located in
coffee municipalities. Unsurprisingly, Quilombos also tend to locate further from the port and
closer to the equator. Differences also exist in the suitability of land for coffee, sugar and cereal
production, as well as in surface area and ruggedness. Quilombos are also less likely to be found
in Sa˜o Paulo, which is unsurprising given the state’s much shorter-lived history of large-scale
slavery compared to Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro.
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Table 3: Matching on observables
Variable t-test before matching t-test after matching
Sugar 1.09 -0.00
Gold 5.29*** -1.40
Coffee -5.77*** -0.00
PortDist 4.56*** 0.56
EquatorDist -6.15*** -0.29
CoffeeSuit -2.27** -1.32
SugarSuit -2.58** -0.89
CottonSuit 1.14 -0.41
CerealSuit 2.52** -0.69
Altitude -0.35 -0.80
Area 5.11*** 0.37
Ruggedness 1.84* 0.68
RJ 1.33 -0.21
SP -5.77*** 0.25
bias before matching bias after matching
Mean 36.7 9.2
Median 31.6 7.9
Matched to 3 nearest neighbors. Propensity score estimated via logit.
All these factors might also have affected economic performance. Geographic character-
istics such as distance from the port, which affects market potential, are well-known drivers
of development, for example. Moreover, the legacy of certain economic activities might affect
development though channels other than the use of slave labour. For these reasons, comparing
municipalities that are very similar in these characteristics, while differing in the intensity of
slave labour, offers the best chance of causally estimating the impact of slavery on economic
development.
I match each Quilombo municipality to the the three nearest neighbors in terms of propensity
score. This specification minimizes residulal bias coming from differences between Quilombo and
non-Quilombo municipalities. After matching, no variable is statistically significantly different
between municipalities featuring Quilombos and those that do not. The overall mean bias due
to differences in the matching variables is reduced from nearly 37% to around 9%, while the
median bias is 7.9%. Ideally, the post-match bias would be somewhat smaller, below 5%, but
other matching strategies were unable to further reduce this measure.
The propensity score matching analysis largely validates the results of the standard re-
gressions (Table 4). The negative impact of slavery proxied by the presence of a Quilombo is
confirmed for literacy and the number of public employees. Having a Quilombo reduces literacy
by nearly 4 percentage points (22%) and the number of public employees by nearly 38%. These
results are larger than those found with OLS. The main difference compared to the standard
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Table 4: Matching results, 1872
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Literacy SchoolAtt PopDens PubEmpl
QuilTreat -0.0389*** 0.00415 -0.839 -0.331***
(0.0113) (0.0240) (0.675) (0.120)
µ DepVar 0.18 0.16 7.41 0.86
σ DepVar 0.10 0.12 0.01 1.22
Observations 437 437 437 437
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are adjusted to account for the fact that the propensity score is estimated, see Abadie and Imbens
(2016). Matching based on the propensity score calculated using the variables detailed in Table 3.
regressions, however, is that the coefficient for population density is not statistically significant
at conventional levels anymore, suggesting that this result might not be robust. As before, I
find no significant effect on school attendance.
In order to make the inference as robust as it can be using the present methodologies, I
also present a matching specification in which I do not just employ geographical and other
predetermined municipal characteristics, but also variables that, in part, might be caused by
the incidence of slavery itself. I do this because these variables might affect economic outcomes
through channels other than slavery. However, this also means that I am stacking the test
against finding an effect of slavery.
The additional variables included in this specification are: 1) the share of free citizens
of African descent, to account for the fact that worse economic outcomes might be due to
discrimination against Afro-Brazilians; 2) the racial fractionalization index proposed by Alesina,
Baqir, and Easterly (1999), to ensure that the effect on economic development is not due to inter-
racial conflict; 3) the share of foreign citizens, to account for both immigration and production
possibilities, since immigrants presumably settled in more prosperous and promising parts of
the country; 4) the share of workers active in agriculture, to ensure that the results are not due
to Quilombo municipalities being more agrarian; 3) the share of capitalists and industrialists in
the population, to further account for differences in the economic structure of municipalities,
particularly for the presence of large-scale land-holdings and industries; 5) the share of slaves
imported from other states in the overall population, to further account for the fact that some
areas were booming and, as a result, acquired more slaves. I do not include the number of
soldiers in the specification because, while not affecting the results, the variable reduces the
quality of the matching.
The extended matching is presented in Table 5. Out of the new variables, the incidence
of imported slaves, the presence of capitalists, the agricultural inclination of the economy and
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Table 5: Extended matching on observables
Variable t-test before matching t-test after matching
Sugar 1.09 0.00
Gold 5.29*** -0.72
Coffee -5.77*** -0.25
PortDist 4.56*** 1.30
EquatorDist -6.15*** -1.01
CoffeeSuit -2.27** -1.17
SugarSuit -2.58** -1.46
CottonSuit 1.14 -0.60
CerealSuit 2.52** -0.76
Altitude -0.35 0.39
Area 5.11*** 048
Ruggedness 1.84* -0.43
RJ 1.33 -1.05
SP -5.77*** -0.06
ImportedSlaves -3.44*** -0.74
Industrialists -0.81 -0.33
Capitalists 1.88* -1.32
AgricShare -3.82*** -0.49
FreeAfricDesc 6.33*** -0.12
ForShare 0.50 0.49
EthnicFract 1.51 -0.42
bias before matching bias after matching
Mean 34.9 10.5
Median 30.5 8.5
Matched to 3 nearest neighbors. Propensity score estimated via logit.
the share of free citizens of African descent all exhibit large and statistically significant dif-
ferences between Quilombo and non-Quilombo municipalities. These are reduced to statistical
insignificance through matching. The overall bias post-matching is 10.5%, which is higher than
in the baseline specification, but still much lower than before matching (35%). The results
of the extended matching regressions are presented in Table 6 and largely mirror those of the
baseline both qualitatively and quantitatively. The one major difference is that the coefficient
for population density is once again statistically significant. While this might mean that the
extended matching takes care of some residual bias present in the baseline specification, the
fact that the result is not consistently significant across different estimations makes it difficult
to establish any definitive result.
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Table 6: Extended matching results, 1872
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Literacy SchoolAtt PopDens PubEmpl
QuilTreat -0.0410*** -0.0104 -1.072*** -0.279***
(0.00467) (0.0172) (0.392) (0.0869)
µ DepVar 0.18 0.16 7.41 0.86
σ DepVar 0.10 0.12 0.01 1.22
Observations 437 437 437 437
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are adjusted to account for the fact that the propensity score is estimated, see (Abadie and
Imbens, 2016). Matching based on the propensity score calculated using the variables detailed in Table 5.
6.3 The impact of slavery post-Abolition
I continue my analysis by assessing the persistence of the impact of slavery post-Abolition, more
precisely in 1920-23, over 30 years after the end of slavery. In order to do this, I relate the inci-
dence of Quilombos per 1000 citizens in 1923 to the following development indicators: literacy,
wages, population density, and public expenditure per capita21 (Table 7). In the first column
for each outcome, I run the same specification as the 1872 regressions. In the second column,
I further control for the 1872 outcomes. In this way, I test whether slavery’s impact consisted
in putting municipalities on a lower developmental trajectory, which is captured captured by
the 1872 outcomes, or whether its legacy continued to affect municipalities after Abolition by
further damaging the local economy. In the latter case, a lower level of development would not
be fully captured by the 1872 variables. This strategy is imperfect because I observe the exact
equivalents of the 1923 outcomes in 1872 only for literacy and population density. However,
developmental outcomes are normally strongly correlated. Therefore, the 1872 variables should
contain useful information for the 1923 outcomes.
The 1872 variables do, indeed, captures some of the variation due to the incidence of slavery
found in the 1923 outcomes. This is demonstrated by the fact that the coefficients on the
Quilombo variable are smaller when these are included. However, for wages and population
density, the Quilombo coefficients remain statistically significant and large. When I do not
control for the 1872 outcomes, adding another Quilombo per 1000 citizens leads to a 15%
decrease in wages, while the estimated effect is 12% when the 1872 variables are included. The
difference is larger for population density: the effect of an additional Quilombo goes from a 74%
reduction in population density to a 65% one.
For literacy and expenditure per capita, instead, the coefficients become much smaller and
21Results are very similar for revenue per capita.
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Table 7: Standard regressions, 1920-23
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Literacy Wages PopDens PubExpenditure
QuilNumb/Pop -0.118* -0.0641 -0.165** -0.129* -1.155 -0.943* -1.074* -0.624
(0.0700) (0.0594) (0.0663) (0.0658) (0.727) (0.562) (0.630) (0.385)
Literacy1872 0.0437** 0.00512 0.0721 0.145*
(0.0187) (0.00854) (0.0520) (0.0769)
PubEmpl1872 0.0560*** 0.0229* 0.0411 0.125*
(0.0210) (0.0121) (0.0813) (0.0644)
PopDens1872 0.0423*** 0.0210 0.239*** 0.110**
(0.0128) (0.0148) (0.0401) (0.0437)
µ DepVar 0.22 7.39 14.88 6.31
σ DepVar .08 1.71 20.06 8.69
Controls
Constant 3 3 3 3
Sugar 3 3 3 3
Gold 3 3 3 3
Coffee 3 3 3 3
LandSuit 3 3 3 3
StateFE 3 3 3 3
GeoControls 3 3 3 3
Observations 428 230 428 428
R2 0.164 0.232 0.455 0.469 0.141 0.629 0.249 0.398
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered at the 1872 municipality level. The regressions are estimated using the Pseudo
Poisson Maximum Likelihood, which is ideal for log-linearized spoecifications (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006,
PPML).
statistically insignificant when I control for the 1872 outcomes. This means that the 11%
and 66% reduction in literacy and public expenditure per capita due to the presence of an
additional Quilombo per 1000 citizens are mostly explained by outcomes observed while slavery
still existed. All 1872 variables – literacy, population density and public employment – explain
some of this variation, as evidenced by their positive and statistically significant coefficients,
highlighting the usefulness of employing a broad range of developmental indicators.
In summary, the results suggest that large-scale slavery put municipalities on a lower devel-
opmental trajectory, affecting variables such as literacy, wages, population density and public
resources. The effect is still visible thirty years after the abolition of slavery. However, in the
case of wages and population density, differences across municipalities caused by the incidence of
slavery are not completely captured by outcomes measured while slavery still existed, suggesting
that the legacy of slavery continued to negatively affect economic development post-Abolition.
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A plausible mechanism for this effect is that slavery thwarted the development of nascent eco-
nomic activities in the late 19th and early 20th, such as industry and other non-agricultural
activities. This would have been the case if slavery damaged the development of efficient mar-
kets for free labor and/or lowered the accumulation of human capital, for example. Differences
in these new activities would have been minimal and/or inconsequential for overall economic
development while slavery still existed, explaining why the 1872 outcomes cannot fully capture
the impact of slavery.
6.4 Including slavery data from the 1872 census
As discussed throughout the paper, the 1872 slavery data is problematic for two main reasons.
One is the timing: observing the spatial distribution of slaves in 1872 does not allow us to
capture the long-term incidence of slavery because of the deep structural changes taking place
in the economy and society in the second half of the 1800s. Even before that, the rise and fall
of the gold and sugar cycles had large effects on the economic geography of Brazil. The second
issue is the non-random location of slaves. For Quilombos this problem is muted because these
were mostly tied to older waves of large-scale slavery and to economic activities that had lost
relevance by the second half of the 19th century and for which we can, in any case, directly
control. The distribution of slaves captured by the 1872 data, instead, is intimately tied to
contemporaneous developments and to economic activities with direct bearing on economic
development in the late 19th and early 20th century. While controlling for the influence of the
coffee boom can mitigate this issue, it is difficult to imagine that all endogenity in the 1872
slave distribution can be accounted for in this way.
At the same time, I have argued that Quilombos are complementary rather than alternative
to the census data because they measure different things: long-standing slave incidence vs recent
changes and developments. Therefore, it is important to assess whether accounting for these
recent changes in the economy and population affects my results. I do this in Table 8.
The first result of note is that the inclusion of the slave ratio does not substantially change the
results for Quilombos. For 1872, for example, I still find a negative impact on literacy of around
8% of an additional Quilombo. For population density the effect is now 13% compared to the
previous 12%, while for public employment it is 33% compared to the 32% found previously.
For 1923, one more Quilombo per 1000 citizens decreases literacy by 11.5%, wages by 15%,
population density by 69% and public expenditure by 66%. The effect is no longer statistically
significant for population density because of the standard errors being larger. Condition number
tests suggest that this is because of high collinearity between the 1872 slavery measure and the
other variables in the regression.
The general conclusions from the previous exercises remain unaltered: the presence of
Quilombos is associated with lower literacy, public employment, wages, revenue and expen-
diture per capita and, possibly, population density. In other words, a large array of economic
development indicators were affected by the intensity of slavery proxied by runaway slave com-
munities. This is true even after controlling for changes in the the economy and structure of
the population in the second half of the 19th century, captured by the 1872 slavery data.
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The results on the slave share variable in themselves are not particularly interesting be-
cause of the endogeneity problems discussed. However, they are useful in highlighting just how
problematic the 1872 data is. For example, the slave share is positively associated with both
literacy and school attendance in 1872. This result could mean that a larger slave population
allowed free citizens to achieve higher literacy and more years of schooling because they could
eschew manual and/or child labour. However, it might also simply indicate that larger slave
populations could be found in wealthier municipalities, with higher levels of human capital.
Furthermore, the slave share is negatively associated with population density and public
employment in 1872, although not significantly for the former. These results are even more
difficult to interpret than the previous ones. Does the lower population density indicate that
large swathes of land were dedicated to plantation agriculture and were thus scarcely inhabited?
Or does it indicate that free citizens were unwilling to settle where slavery was more prevalent?
Or could it mean that areas with large slave populations had a stunted development? Similarly,
does the result for public employment suggest that plantation owners prevented the development
of a strong bureaucracy, which could threaten their hold of power at the local level – a hypothesis
that has a strong qualitative pedigree –, or is there another explanation, for example that slaves
smuggled in after the 1831 ban of the slave trade could more easily be found in areas where the
bureaucracy was less present?
Table 8: Controlling for the 1872 slave ratio
1872 1920-23
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Literacy SchoolAtt PopDens PubEmpl Literacy Wage PopDens PubExpenditure
SlaveShare72 0.183** 0.321*** -0.755 -1.950*** 0.274 -0.00928 -1.574* -0.245
(0.0742) (0.103) (6.803) (0.657) (0.247) (0.200) (0.835) (0.852)
QuilNumb/Pop72 -0.0144*** -0.00533 -0.943** -0.279***
(0.00525) (0.00566) (0.422) (0.0788)
QuilNumb/Pop23 -0.122* -0.164** -1.162 -1.065*
(0.0704) (0.0663) (0.742) (0.632)
Controls
Constant 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Sugar 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Gold 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Coffee 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
LandSuit 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
StateFE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
GeoControls 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 437 437 437 437 428 230 428 428
R2 0.243 0.131 0.132 0.312 0.166 0.455 0.164 0.247
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered at the 1872 municipality level. The 1872 regressions are run using OLS and the
1920-23 regressions are estimated using the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood, as above (Santos Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006).
32
While these questions have, at present, no answer, they illustrate the challenges associated
with studying the impact of slavery in Brazil using the 1872 census data and why its use
has resulted in a number of inconclusive studies. Furthermore, they highlight the need for
an alternative measure of slavery able to capture the incidence of the institution before the
tumultuous and long-lasting changes of the second half of the 19th century. This paper attempts
to do just that.
6.5 The impact of immigration
Table 9 illustrates the first set of results of the final empirical exercise of the paper, which
links immigration – proxied by the presence of immigrant colonies – to economic development,
represented by indicators of state/fiscal capacity. I run this analysis exclusively for Sa˜o Paulo
because the state was the only one active enough in the creation of immigrant colonies to
allow for this empirical approach. Apart for the inclusion of the colonies, the econometric
specification is very similar to that used in previous exercises. The only difference is that,
because of the importance of the coffee boom for Sa˜o Paulo specifically and its role in attracting
immigrants, I not only control for the presence of coffee production in the municipalities, but
also for its indirect influence, proxied by distance from production sites. This data also comes
from Naritomi, Soares, and Assunc¸a˜o (2012). The results of the estimation confirm both the
hypothesis – that immigration had a positive impact, and that this was linked to the contrast
between free and slave labor – and the validity of the identification strategy laid out in Section
4.2.
To recap, colonies created to host new European immigrants by the planters in collaboration
with the state between 1829 and 1939 are divided into three groups: 1) those created while
slavery still existed (1829-89), which represent the treatment; 2) those created after the end of
slavery, but before my period of observation (1890-1912), which are designed to asses whether
different waves of migration had different impacts on economic development; 3) those created
after my period of observation (1913-39), which act as placebos. The presence of a colony of
each group in a municipality is introduced as a dummy in the regressions. Municipalities with
no colonies are the control grouop
If immigration did indeed have a positive effect, particularly immigration taking place during
the slave era, and colonies were not simply located in the “best” municipalities from an economic
development perspective, we would expect the following results: 1) a positive and statistically
significant coefficient for the first group of colonies, 2) a potentially positive, but smaller and not
necessarily statistically significant coefficient for the second group, 3) a coefficient statistically
indistinguishable from or smaller than zero for the third group. A zero coefficient for this last
group would indicate that colonies were not simply placed in better locations, while a negative
coefficient would indicate that they might have actually been placed in areas that were initially
relatively worse from an economic development perspective. The results are consistent with
these expectations.
For revenue per capita, the coefficient of the pre-1890 colonies – those created while slavery
still existed – is positive, large and highly statistically significant. For expenditure per capita,
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Table 9: Immigrant colonies, 1912
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES PubRevenue PubExpenditure PubServices
Colony1829-1899 0.471** 0.314 0.825***
(0.213) (0.238) (0.301)
Colony1890-1912 0.0294 0.109 -0.189
(0.309) (0.328) (0.309)
Colony1913-1938 -0.797 -1.078 -0.667
(0.903) (0.931) (0.467)
Controls
Constant 3 3 3
LandSuit 3 3 3
GeoControls 3 3 3
Coffee 3 3 3
CoffeeInfl 3 3 3
Observations 163 163 153
R2 0.539 0.563 0.108
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered at the 1872 municipal level. Revenue and expenditure per capita are 1908-1912
averages, public services expenditure per capita is measured in 1912. See Appendix A for details.
the coefficient is not statistically significant, but focusing on the part of public expenditure
related to the provision of key public services – including infrastructure, lights, health, water,
sewers and education – yields a positive and statically significant coefficient once again. More
precisely, the presence of a colony increases revenue per capita by 60% and expenditure on
public services per capita by nearly 130%.
The coefficients of the post-Abolition colonies, instead, are not significantly different from
zero, indicating that the immigration wave, which took place when the contrast between free and
slave labour had disappeared, had no discernible positive effect on indicators of state/fiscal ca-
pacity. Finally, the coefficients of the post-1912 placebo colonies are indistinguishable from zero
for revenue and expenditure and negative for public services, as required by the identification
strategy.
As a final exercise, I also relate the 1920-23 outcomes to the presence of immigrant colonies
(Table 10). Because of the insufficient number of colonies created after 1923, rather than having
a category for placebo colonies, I simply divide the colonies between those created before and
after the end of slavery. Once again, if my hypothesis is true, the first group of colonies should
yield positive and statistically significant coefficients. The second group of colonies combines
the two purposes of the two groups of post-1889 colonies above: 1) ensuring that colonies were
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not simply placed in better locations, 2) differentiating between the effect of different migration
waves.
Table 10: Immigrant colonies, 1920-23
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Literacy Wage PopDens PubExpenditure
Colony1829-1899 0.367*** 0.0918** 0.709*** 0.511***
(0.0970) (0.0382) (0.214) (0.171)
Colony1890-1938 0.0564 -0.0509 0.0150 0.0323
(0.0849) (0.0449) (0.190) (0.239)
Controls
Constant 3 3 3 3
LandSuit 3 3 3 3
GeoControls 3 3 3 3
Coffee 3 3 3 3
CoffeeInfl 3 3 3 3
Observations 202 148 202 202
R2 0.301 0.431 0.381 0.507
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered at the 1872 municipal level. Revenue and expenditure per capita are 1908-1912
averages, public services expenditure per capita is measured in 1912. See Appendix A for details.
The results are largely in line with the previous ones. Colonies founded before the end of
slavery all have large, positive and strongly statistically coefficients, while the coefficients for
post 1889 colonies are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Quantitatively, the
estimates indicate 44% higher literacy, 10% higher wages, 100% higher population density and
67% higher public expenditure in municipalities with pre-1890 colonies.
Thus, the results indicate that, despite the fact that later immigration is generally considered
to have been fundamental for the overall economic development of Brazil, early immigration
was crucial in shaping differential spatial developments within the country. As discussed in
detail in Section 7, this is presumably because municipalities that were able to switch out of
large-scale slavery earlier thanks to immigration, found themselves on a higher developmental
path.
7 Potential channels and narrative evidence
There are several ways in which slavery might have influenced economic development. A widely
cited hypothesis is that slavery thwarted the development of free markets for labour, affecting
wages and the viability of industries other than primary commodity production (Klein and
Luna, 2010).
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The disjointed and uneven nature of Brazilian labour markets is reflected in this quota-
tion from the January 1988 report to the provincial assembly by the president of Sa˜o Paulo.
Additionally, in it, immigration is proposed as a way of mitigating the problem:
It can be observed from the statistics I referred to that immigration has concentrated
in the well-known areas of the West and South of the province. [...] However, the
benefit should extend to all municipalities, according to their needs. The North, more
precisely the Northeast of the province, needs to be part of this phenomenon. While
a large number of municipalities in this area found a good substitute for slaves in
the local population, and in many places this is well established, I am convinced that
the inclusion of foreign workers will be very effective in stimulating new production
and reviving existing establishments. Domestic work has, until now, not had an
adequate legal organization. Legal conditions are so different from one municipality
to the next that I do not believe it effective to introduce uniform general measures
in such an important area.22
Several explanations also exist linking slavery to low human capital and fiscal capacity.
First, slaves were not educated. This reduced the need for public education, and for revenue
to fund it. Second, a greater reliance on slave labour deprived a large share of the population
of a political voice, reducing the strength of demands for the provision of public goods. At the
same time, this also reduced the incentive of municipalities to attract workers or prevent them
from emigrating through the quality of public services, since slaves obviously could not “vote
with their feet”. Thus, the availability of a large pool of slave labour reduced the strength of
free citizens’ demands, the accountability of local state representatives and their incentives to
supply public services. Moreover, local oligarchs, most prevalent in regions with slave-based
economies, had an interest in keeping taxation, public spending and education levels low and in
limiting the outside options of the local population. This reduced their tax burden and ensured
the availability of cheap labour, as well as the perpetuation of clientelism and patronage on
which a large share of their influence depended.
There are also good reasons to believe that the impact of slavery persisted after its abolition,
and that its persistence was proportional to its previous pervasiveness. In areas with a long-
history of slave labour, such as the Para´ıba valley and the state of Rio de Janeiro, ex-slaves
often remained as artisans, workers in the growing industrial sector or as sharecroppers on coffee
plantations. Slaves in frontier areas of Sa˜o Paulo, instead, tended to relocate to other areas,
particularly the city of Sa˜o Paulo (Fausto, 1999).
We also know from the experience of the US South that landowners actively limited the
outside options of ex-slaves in order to tie them to the plantations. This was achieved, for ex-
ample, by successfully lobbying the Federal government to limit the growth of the welfare state,
while privately supplying similar services within paternalistic and clientelistic relationships (Al-
22Author’s translation from the“relatorio apresentado a´ Assemble´a Legislativa Provincial de Sa˜o Paulo pelo
presidente da provincia, exm. snr. dr. Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves, no dia 10 de janeiro de 1888. Sa˜o
Paulo,” page 33, Jorge Seckler & Comp.
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ston and Ferrie, 1985, 1993). Different tools, such as vagrancy laws, were used in the Brazilian
context, but the objectives were very similar (Huggins, 1985; Klein and Luna, 2010; Bucciferro,
2017). Ex-slaves and free citizens of African descent also continued to face discrimination and
their social mobility remained limited. This phenomenon became particularly pronounced after
Abolition when poor whites saw Afro-Brazilians as more concrete competition for jobs, land-
owners feared their newly-found leverage and rights and the elites wished to push for racial
whitening through immigration and miscegenation (da Costa, 2000; Machado, 2006; Slenes,
2010; Graham, 2016). This meant that slavery’s shadow continued to affect the individual and
collective economic and social status of Afro-Brazilians.
The problematic relationship between immigration and slavery has also been widely dis-
cussed. While many authors have argued that the existence of slavery discouraged mass immi-
gration from Europe (Klein and Luna, 2010), this did eventually take place and began already
before slavery was abolished. Moreover, local free labor existed before mass immigration, and
the incidence of slavery was vastly different across the Brazilian territory. Therefore, slavery
presumably affected the viability of free labour and immigration to a different extent in different
parts of the country.
In Sa˜o Paulo, the duality between slave and free labour was particularly salient, especially
in the 1880s, while large scale immigration and slavery coexisted. The presence of large slave
populations in a municipality likely reduced the settlements of immigrants due to both a lower
demand for free labour and the extremely negative perception slavery had acquired by the
late 19th century, both within and outside Brazil. Evidence of this are the pamphlets created
to attract European immigrants to Brazil by the Society for the Promotion of Immigration,23
which purposely failed to mention the existence of slavery (Fausto, 1999). It is also useful to
recall that Brazil was one of the last countries to abolish the institution.
Rhetoric aside, this quotation by the president of Sa˜o Paulo from a report to the provincial
assembly from January 1889, merely 8 months after the abolition of slavery, illustrates the
perceived impact slavery had on potential immigrants to Brazil:
We were not known to civilized nations. Slavery made us barbarians in the eyes
of foreigners and, due to ignorance or bad faith, outside of Portugal, which as a
whole could not populate just one of our provinces, the idea of migrating to Brazil
for those who could, if at all there, was considered terrible. It appeared as a country
not habitable by civilized people, due to endemic diseases and its climate. This false
judgement is now completely undone. Thousands of letters from Italians, Belgians
Germans, Spaniards and individuals from other nations cross the seas, bringing to
their relatives and friends that remained behind the welcome news that immigrants
found in the Paulista land an adoptive home that is free and happy, where there is
room for all aspirations and for all faiths, with a governmental structure modeled in
line with the most civilized in the world.24
23In Portoguese: Sociedade Promotora de Imigraca˜o. It was founded by members of the Paulista elite keen on
promoting European migration to the province in 1886.
24Author’s translation from the “relatorio apresentado a´ Assemble´a Legislativa Provincial de Sa˜o Paulo pelo
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As shown, there are reasons to believe that slavery affected the spatial distribution of im-
migrants. But in what way could immigration have affected economic development?
The existing literature offers abundant indications that immigration played a big role in
Brazilian economic development. Stolz, Baten, and Botelho (2013), for example, find that it
had positive effects on human capital and income per capita in the long term. de Carvalho Filho
and Monasteiro (2012) look specifically at settler colonies in the Southern state of Rio Grande
do Sul and show that proximity to these is related to better economic outcomes today. Rocha,
Ferraz, and Soares (2017) find similarly positive effects for Sa˜o Paulo. None of these previous
papers, however, provides fully fledged identification strategies to deal with the endogeneity
of immigrant settlement. Moreover, they draw no distinction between migration taking place
before and after the end of slavery. This paper addresses both issues and shows that the positive
impact of immigration was largest and clearest for settlements created while slavery was not yet
abolished, suggesting that the contrast between slave and free labour is at the heart of these
results.
Through which channels did the effects of migration occur? First, immigrants probably
had a higher degree of human capital compared to both the slave and free local population.
Second, immigration likely had in impact on local institutions. As already suggested above,
well-functioning markets for free labor were more likely to develop where large numbers of mi-
grants settled, for example. Moreover, migrants provided a stimulus for the provision of public
goods. This is because, unlike slaves, they could “vote with their feet” and, unlike the local
population, they were used to higher European levels of public goods provision. Thus, compe-
tition between municipalities keen on attracting workers from abroad presumably manifested
itself in the provision of education, healthcare, sewers, public lights and other services. Migrant
communities also often set up their own schools, and were generally successful in obtaining at
least partial public financing for their running (de Carvalho Filho and Colistete, 2010). Finally,
in areas where migrants settled, the paternalism and clientelism that characterized much of
Brazilian local politics were less likely to thrive, because such relationships would need to be
established anew with a different class of citizens that was geographically mobile.
Thus, at least part of the effect of immigration likely worked through political representa-
tion. However, it is not the type of political representation embedded in the formal institutions
emphasized by much of the literature – for example Acemoglu, Bautista, Querub´ın, and Robin-
son (2008) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2012) – and analyzed by Summerhill (2010) and Funari
(2017) in the Brazilian setting. These studies have focused on the impact of the extent of the
political franchise and of the right to vote. I argue that it was the migrants’ geographical mo-
bility and their ability to leverage Brazil’s labour shortage that mattered. This might explain
why the latter authors find no link between narrowly political representation and development.
presidente da provincia, dr. Pedro de Azevedo, no dia 11 de Janeiro de 1889,” Jorge Steckler & Comp.
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8 Conclusion
Slavery has long being singled out as one of the determinants of economic underperformance in
both sending and receiving countries. Despite this, no conclusive empirical evidence exists on
the impact of slavery in Brazil, the largest importer of slaves during the Atlantic slave trade.
Using a new measure of the intensity of slavery – the presence of communities descended
from those created by escaped slaves, the Quilombos – I overcome the limitations of census-
based measures used in the past, and show that slavery had a large and persistent negative effect
on economic development also in Brazil. Additionally, I use the location of immigrant colonies
to demonstrate that immigration taking place while slavery still existed had a positive effect
on local economic development, while no comparable effect can be detected for later migration
waves. This indicates that the contrast between slave and free labour is at the heart of both
the negative impact of slavery and the positive impact of immigration on Brazilian economic
development.
In summary, slavery likely affected economic development both directly and indirectly. On
the one hand, slaves lacked the, however limited, political voice and rights that free Brazilians
had, and their presence rendered the creation of efficient markets for free labour and the pro-
vision of public goods, such as education, far less pressing. On the other hand, slavery limited
the settlement of foreign migrants and thus the extent to which this dynamic group of citizens
was able to shape local economic and institutional developments.
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A Variable definition and sources
Throughout the paper, I provide information on the sources of the data. In this Appendix, I
provide information on how I deal with the creation of new municipalities after 1872, as well
as any additional data issues. Additionally, I describe in detail how the variables used in the
estimation are constructed. Unless otherwise stated, all the 1872 data is from that year’s census
(Brazil, 1876) and refer to Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo.
New municipalities: New municipalities were created between 1872 and 1920-23. In order to
maximize the number of observations available and minimize measurement error that could
arise through aggregation, I identify parishes present in the 1872 census that had become
municipalities by 1923 and use their own data instead of the aggregate municipal measures.
I also subtract these parishes from the municipality they belonged to in 1872, further increasing
the precision of my estimates. All regressions are run based on municipalities existing in 1923.
An alternative to this strategy would be to aggregate municipalities in minimum comparable
areas (MCAs) with unchanged borders between the periods of observation. This, however, would
entail the loss of a large degree of information, since very heterogeneous units would be averaged
out in the same geographical areas. For this reason, I prefer the painstaking manual linking of
municipalities over time.
Not all 1923 municipalities existed as parishes in 1872 and can thus be identified in the
census. Out of Minas Gerais’ 178 municipalities in 1923 I identify 163, for Sa˜o Paulo’s I identify
123 out of 212 and for Rio de Janeiro, data can be retrieved for 48 out of the 49 municipalities
existing in 1923. The remaining municipalities are assigned values from their municipality of
origin, purged of the parishes which later on became municipalities.
Quilombos: Data on the location and number of officially recognized Quilombola communities
in each Brazilian municipality comes from the government agency Fundac¸a˜o Cultural Palmares.
According to Brazilian law (article 2 of Decree number 4887, of 20 November 2003) Quilombos
or more precisely comunidades remanescentes de quilombo (remaining Quilombo communities)
are ethnic and racial groups, which, according to criteria of self-attribution, have a distinct
historical trajectory, specific relations to the local territory, and the presumption of a black
ancestry related to the resistance to oppression suffered in history.25
Quilombos are entered in the regressions as a dummy, as the number of communities per
municipality, both raw and normalized by the relevant population. I detail how the variable is
used throughout the text.
Slave share: is the share of slaves in the population of each municipality. I calculate this for
1872.
Free Population of African descent: is the share of individuals classified as free blacks (pre-
tos) or mulattoes (pardos) as a share of the total free population of each municipality; brancos
(whites), and cablocos (people of indigenous origin) are the residula categories. I calculate this
for 1872. For a discussion of the issue of racial classification in Brazilian censuses, see de Paiva
Rio Camargo (2009).
25In the original Portoguese: “consideram-se remanescentes das comunidades dos quilombos, para os fins deste
Decreto, os grupos e´tnico-raciais, segundo critrios de auto-atribuic¸a˜o, com trajeto´ria histo´rica pro´pria, dotados de
relac¸o˜es territoriais espec´ıficas, com presunc¸a˜o de ancestralidade negra relacionada com a resisteˆncia a´ opressa˜o
histo´rica sofrida.”
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Location of commodity production: Data on where sugar, gold and coffee were produced
in Brazil was kindly provided by Naritomi, Soares, and Assunc¸a˜o (2012). Sugar and gold refer
to colonial period production, which, in the case of sugar, continued also post-Independence,
whereas gold production became marginal by the end of the 18th century. Coffee production
is divided into two separate parts referring to the early expansion of the coffee boom (up until
1886), and its successive expansion (1887-1935). I use both in my analysis depending on the
specific needs of the regression and detail this in the text. The authors constructed a variable
indicating the influence of the production of each of these commodities on each municipality
in Brazil based on the inverse of the distance of their centroid from a municipality producing
each commodity, capped at 200km. Municipalities where the commodity was produced receive
a value of 1. I use this information to create two separate sets of variables: 1) dummies identi-
fying municipalities where each commodity was actually produced, 2) variables containing the
inverse of the distance from these same municipalities, capped at 200km, which interpret as the
indirect influence of commodity production. In this way, I actually expand the informational
content of the variables used in the original paper, since I distinguish between the effect of
actual commodity production and its indirect influence.
Soldiers: This variable serves as a proxy for reach of the coercive power of the state. It is the
number of soldiers residing in a municipality normalized by population size in 1872.
Justice workers: This is an alternative proxy for reach of the coercive power of the state. It
is the number of judges, attorneys and justice officials residing in a municipality normalized by
population size in 1872.
Literacy: measures the share of the population who is reported to be able to read and write.
I calculate this for 1872 and 1920. All slaves were classified as illiterate, so for 1872 I calculate
this only for the free population. The 1920 source is the census (Brazil, 1920b).
School attendance: is the the share of the eligible population – free children between the ages
of 6 and 15 – who attended school. What “attending school” exactly meant at the time and
how the classification between those who did and those who did not was drawn is not clear; e.g.
how many school days per year did a child need to attend to be classified as having attended
school in the census? This might help explain why the findings for this variable are inconclusive.
I calculate this for 1872.
Public employment: This variable serves as a proxy for fiscal/state capacity. It is the number
of public employees residing in a municipality normalized by population size in 1872.
Population density: is the number of people living within a municipality normalized by the
surface area of that same municipality. I calculate this for 1872 and 1920 dividing the popu-
lation size obtained from the 1872 census and IBGE (2011) by the area in square kilometers
calculated based on the maps provided by IBGE (2011).
Public revenue and expenditure: refer to the public revenue and expenditure of the munic-
ipalities of Minas Gerias, Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo normalized by the size of the population
for the respective years. I collect these variables for 1908-1912 from the 1908-12 Brazilian sta-
tistical yearbook (Brazil, 1908-1912). For 1923, the public finance data is from (Brazil, 1926),
while the population data is from IBGE (2011).
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Composition of revenue and expenditure: I collect this information for Sa˜o Paulo in 1912
from the state’s statistical yearbook from the same year (Sa˜o Paulo, 1912). The data are more
detailed than in the Brazil-wide yearbook, and thus provide a more complete picture of the
municipalities’ public finances. Revenue is classified as follows. Ordinary revenue: any remain-
ing positive balance from the previous exercise, tax on industries and professions, property tax,
transportation taxes, tax on coffee trees, taxes on water, sewer taxes, income of the cemetery,
income of the slaughterhouse, income from the market, income from public lighting, recovery
of active claims. Extraordinary revenue: deposits and cautions, state subsidy, loans obtained
in the fiscal year. The components of expenditure are as follows. Ordinary expenditure: public
works, street cleaning, public lighting, public health, market, cemetery, slaughterhouse, public
water, public sewers, public education, wages and subsidies of municipal workers, office and pub-
lication expenses of the municipality, judicial expenses, extraordinary expenses, other expenses.
Extraordinary expenditure: refunds and returned deposits.
Using these data, I construct my additional outcome variable: public service expenditure
per capita. This is simply the expenditure on items clearly identifiable as public goods or other
public services normalized by population. These services are: public works, street cleaning,
public lighting, public health, market, cemetery, slaughterhouse, public water, public sewers,
public education.
Wages: are the wages of carpenters collected in the 1920 census Brazil (1920a). The census
reports the wages of a number of different professions, but carpenters’ wages are the most widely
reported. The census provides information on standard wages and wages when food and board
are included, which are lower. I employ standard wages because the value and food and board
would otherwise not be included in the remuneration measures and wages would offer only a
partial picture.
Location of settler colonies: information on this comes from a map held at the Digital
Archive of the Immigration Museum of Sa˜o Paulo state (Gagliardi, 1958).
Foreign share: is the share of free citizens living in a municipality born outside of Brazil. This
excludes free Africans, who are, most likely, freed slaves and thus not voluntary immigrants. I
calculate this for 1872.
Imported slaves: is the share of slaves in the population of a municipality born in a Brazilian
province other than the one where the municipality is located. I calculate this for 1872.
Industrialists and capitalists: I construct the two variables as the share of citizens in the
total population categorized as such in the census. I calculate this for 1872.
Agricultural Share: is simply a measure of the share of citizens of a municipality working in
the agricultural sector. This includes animal husbandry. I calculate this for 1872.
Racial fractionalization: the 1872 census divided the Brazilian population into four self-
reported categories: brancos (whites), pardos (mulattoes), pretos (blacks) and cablocos (people
of indigenous origin). I calculate the degree of fractionalization in each municipality using the
the index proposed by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999). The index’s formula is:
RacialFrac = 1−
4∑
i=1
Race2i
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where Race corresponds to share of the population belonging to each of the four self-reported
categories outlined.
Geographical controls: Distance from the equator comes from Naritomi, Soares, and As-
sunc¸a˜o (2012). I construct the other variables – distance from the closest port, altitude, rugged-
ness and surface area – based on municipal borders in 1920 as per the maps provided by the
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica (IBGE, 2011). All variables are municipal aver-
ages. Distance from the port – Rio de Janeiro or Santos – whichever is closer – is measured
from to the centroid of each municipality and is an as the crow flies distance, taking into ac-
count the earth’s curvature. The raw altitude data in 1km by 1km cells is from WorldClim
(www.corldclim.org). I use this to calculate both average altitude of each municipality and its
ruggedness.
Land suitability: I also construct these variables based on municipal borders in 1920 and
as per the maps provided by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica (IBGE, 2011).
Again, these variables are municipal averages. the raw data is from the Food and Agriculture
Organization (2012) and is based on monthly statistics of climatic variables and precipitation
for the period 1960-90, collected in 10-30 arc minutes cells. It refers to the cultivation of sugar
cane, coffee and cotton, Brazil’s three main cash crops in the period I study. In all regressions,
I also control for the suitability of land for cereal production, which provides information on
general land suitability for non cash-crop production.
Although the FAO land suitability data is constructed using data from the 1960s until the
1990s, it is also extremely useful and widely used in historical studies. To get as close as possible
to conditions faced by planters in the 19th and early 20th century, I use suitability data based
on the absence of irrigation and the lowest possible level of inputs by planters. The low input
scenario is essentially one of subsistence agriculture, with labor intensive techniques, no use of
chemicals and minimal conservation measures. These assumptions are conservative given that
the production of cash crops was well beyond subsistence and that, in the second half of the
19th century, mechanization of some processes had started to take place.
The data squares nicely with historical accounts of crops cultivation. The Para´ıba valley,
located across the border between the two states, stands out as a relatively suitable area for
coffee production. Indeed, it was the first large-scale coffee production centre in the country.
The north and west of Sa˜o Paulo and the south of Minas Gerais also emerge as very suitable for
coffee production and, in fact, these areas witnessed a huge expansion in coffee production in
the late 19th and early 20th century. Regarding sugar cane, the east of Rio De Janeiro emerges
as a particularly suitable area for its production, as it was indeed historically. The west and
north of Sa˜o Paulo also appear to be suitable for this cultivation, as well as for cotton. However,
the late exploitation of the province’s backlands means that Sa˜o Paulo was never a big player in
the production of these two commodities, although sugar was the province’s main export before
the arrival of coffee.
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